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Jones v. Chappell: The California Death
Penalty is Unconstitutional
By SIMON MAXWELL LEVY*
[F]or most [inmates on death row], systemic delay has made their execution so unlikely
that the death sentence carefully and deliberately imposed by the jury has been quietly
transformed into one no rational jury or legislature could ever impose: life in prison,
with the remote possibility of death.1

Introduction

O

N JULY 16, 2014, Federal District Judge Cormac J. Carney held
California’s death penalty scheme unconstitutional.2 The petitioner in the
case, Ernest DeWayne Jones, raised a number of challenges to his death
sentence, but Judge Carney focused on the inordinate delays associated with
California’s post-conviction appeals process—delays that had already kept
Jones on death row for nearly two decades. Based on the significant delay
between the imposition of a death sentence and actual execution in
California, Judge Carney held that it was essentially random which offenders
were executed as opposed to dying from natural causes, suicide, or violent
incidents in prison.3 This randomness stands in direct opposition to the
United States Supreme Court’s mandate, handed down in Furman v. Georgia,4
that the death penalty not be arbitrarily imposed. In ruling on Jones’s habeas
petition, Judge Carney became the first judge in California to look at
empirical evidence of the death penalty’s actual functioning in the state and
to hold its scheme unconstitutional.
This Note will examine the U.S. District Court for the Central District
of California’s Jones v. Chappell opinion and consider its implications for

* Simon M. Levy, J.D., University of San Francisco School of Law (2015). The author
would like to thank his parents and Julia for their love and support, and Professor Steven Shatz for
his guidance, not just in this paper, but in navigating law school in general. The author also extends
special thanks to Patrick Tuck and the rest of the University of San Francisco Law Review staff.
1. Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2014).
2. Id. at 1069.
3. Id. at 1062.
4. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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California’s death row population. Further, Jones’s consideration of empirical
evidence has potentially far-reaching implications for future death penalty
challenges. The arbitrariness in California’s death penalty jurisprudence and
its consequences is not limited to the way those chosen to be executed for
their crimes actually die, but also influences the way capital murder is
defined, as well as when a prosecutor chooses to pursue the death penalty.
Part I discusses relevant U.S. Supreme Court precedent to the Jones
decision and describes the current state of the death penalty in California.
Part II analyzes Jones, focusing on its application of U.S. Supreme Court
precedent to empirical evidence of arbitrariness in the application of the
death penalty. Finally, Part III considers the implications for death row
inmates in California and then describes the nature and sources of
arbitrariness inherent in the California death penalty scheme and how the
Jones decision may support other data-driven challenges to the death penalty
in California.

I. The Eighth Amendment and the California Death
Penalty Scheme
The Jones decision reflects Judge Carney’s understanding of the U.S.
Supreme Court cases interpreting the Eighth Amendment and of the realities
of the California death penalty scheme. Part A of the foregoing section
reviews the relevant Eighth Amendment law, while Part B describes the
California scheme in operation.

A. The Eighth Amendment and the Problem of Arbitrariness
and Delay
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual
punishment.”5 In a series of decisions beginning in the 1970s, the U.S.
Supreme Court established that, in order for the death penalty to comport
with the Eighth Amendment, it must be applied in a consistent and orderly
manner.6 More recently, the Court has struggled with the question of
whether long delays between sentencing and execution contravene the
Eighth Amendment’s mandate.7

5.
6.
7.

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
See infra Parts I.A.1–2.
See infra Part I.A.3.
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1. Overruling Death: Furman v. Georgia
In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Furman v. Georgia, overruling
the capital sentencing scheme in Georgia.8 In effect, Furman invalidated the
death penalty laws of all thirty-nine states that allowed for death as a possible
punishment.9 In Furman, empirical evidence demonstrated that only 15 to
20% of offenders who were statutorily eligible for the death penalty in
Georgia were eventually sentenced to death.10 Justices William Brennan and
Thurgood Marshall believed that the death penalty was cruel and unusual
per se.11 Whereas, Justices William Douglas, Potter Stewart, and Byron White
believed that the death penalty was unconstitutional as applied, but each for
different reasons. The four dissenters saw no constitutional problem with the
death penalty theoretically or as applied. Thus, the three concurring opinions
of Justices White, Douglas, and Stewart controlled the decision. Ultimately,
as discussed below, Justice Stewart’s and Justice White’s concurrences came
to embody the holding of Furman as interpreted by the Court’s subsequent
decisions.12 Both Justices Stewart and White were concerned that the death
penalty was being arbitrarily imposed, but each defined the involved
arbitrariness differently.
Justice Stewart’s principal concern was the seemingly random way in
which some defendants were selected to die, while others found guilty of
committing similar crimes were not.13 To that effect, Justice Stewart
described the petitioners in Furman as “among a capriciously selected random
handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed.”14 For
Justice Stewart, there was no legally significant way to explain why those
defendants who received the death penalty were any more deserving than
8. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40.
9. Id. at 417–18 (Powell, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 435 n.11 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also Steven F. Shatz & Terry Dalton,
Challenging the Death Penalty with Statistics: Furman, McCleskey, and a Single County Case Study, 34
CARDOZO L. REV. 1227, 1231 (2013).
11. Furman, 408 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 360–70 (Marshall, J., concurring).
12. Justice Douglas’s concurrence addressed the equal protection concerns created by the
death penalty as applied at the time of Furman. Douglas explained:
[W]e know that the discretion of judges and juries in imposing the death penalty enables
the penalty to be selectively applied, feeding prejudices against the accused if he is poor
and despised, and lacking political clout, or if he is a member of a suspect or unpopular
minority, and saving those who by social position may be in a more protected position.
Id. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring). Douglas observed that, with unfettered discretion to apply the
death penalty to certain crimes, judges and juries were bound to be influenced by arbitrary and
illegitimate factors such as prejudice based on class and race.
13. Id. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
14. Id.
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their similarly situated peers, rendering those death sentences wholly
arbitrary.15 In this regard, Justice Stewart compared being sentenced to
death to being struck by lightning.16
Justice White’s concurrence addressed a similar concern to Justice
Stewart’s, only framed slightly differently. Justice White discussed the
infrequency of death sentences issued in Georgia relative to the number of
death-eligible crimes committed.17 In Justice White’s view, the death penalty
could not serve as a deterrent to future crime while being invoked so
infrequently.18 He concluded that the death penalty would be cruel and
unusual if it did not serve some societal end.19 Justice White explained:
At the moment that [the death penalty] ceases realistically to further these
purposes, . . . the emerging question is whether its imposition . . . would
violate the Eighth Amendment. It is my view that it would, for its
imposition would then be the pointless and needless extinction of life . . .
. A penalty with such negligible returns to the State would be patently
excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth
Amendment.20

2. The Risk of Arbitrariness: Furman v. Georgia to McCleskey v.
Kemp
The “holding” of Furman is perhaps best understood as articulated by
the U.S. Supreme Court in its subsequent decisions interpreting it. In Gregg
v. Georgia, the Court approved Georgia’s new death penalty scheme.21 That
same day, the Court also approved of the statutory schemes implemented in
Florida22 and Texas.23 In all three cases, the Court approved the statutes on
their face based on the belief that the new laws upheld Furman’s mandate that
the death penalty “could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that
created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and

15. Id. at 310 (“[I]f any basis can be discerned for the selection of these few to be sentenced
to die, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of race.”).
16. Id. at 309 (“These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck
by lightning is cruel and unusual.”).
17. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
18. Id. at 312 (“[C]ommon sense and experience tell us that seldom-enforced laws become
ineffective measures for controlling human conduct and that the death penalty, unless imposed with
sufficient frequency, will make little contribution to deterring those crimes for which it may be
exacted.”).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976).
22. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
23. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
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capricious manner.”24 The Court believed that the Georgia scheme
accomplished this in two ways: (1) by more narrowly defining the class of
death-eligible crimes,25 and (2) by providing for a comparative
proportionality review of every death sentence by the Georgia Supreme
Court.26
Seven years after Gregg, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Zant v.
Stephens,27 which further articulated the principles discussed in Furman.28 In
upholding the petitioners’ death sentences, Justice John Paul Stevens, writing
for the majority, held that, to satisfy the Eighth Amendment, a death penalty
scheme’s aggravating circumstances had to “genuinely narrow the class of
persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the
imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others
found guilty of murder.”29 In both Gregg and Zant, the Court identified that
reducing the number of statutorily death-eligible crimes, along with
providing for comparative appellate review of each death sentence, was one
way that a death penalty scheme could satisfy Furman’s mandate that the
penalty not be arbitrarily imposed.
The Court’s theory was that by limiting the number of death-eligible
crimes to those deemed to be the most socially reprehensible, the likelihood
that judges and juries would sentence perpetrators of those crimes to death
would increase, thereby mitigating the possibility that impermissible factors
such as race might influence their decision. Furthermore, the Georgia
Supreme Court reviewed every death sentence, which would hypothetically
ensure that the death penalty was applied in some kind of consistent
fashion.30 The problem, however, was that these features were never tested
in application in Georgia or in any other state.31 Instead, schemes exhibiting
these characteristics on their face were approved as being compatible with
Furman.32
In McCleskey v. Kemp,33 the petitioner attempted to meaningfully test the
Court’s theoretical approach to limiting arbitrariness in the death penalty’s

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188.
Id. at 222 (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 196–98 (majority opinion).
462 U.S. 862 (1983).
Id. at 876–77.
Id. at 877.
Id. at 876.
See Shatz & Dalton, supra note 10, at 1234.
Id.
481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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application.34 Despite the Court’s previous approval of the Georgia death
penalty scheme on its face in Gregg and Zant, the petitioner in McCleskey sought
to demonstrate that racial bias permeated the Georgia death penalty
scheme.35 Warren McCleskey was an African American man, sentenced to
death for killing a white police officer.36 In challenging his sentence,
McCleskey presented the results of a study performed by Professor David
Baldus and others (“Baldus Study”).37 Specifically, the Baldus Study
demonstrated that defendants convicted of killing white victims in Georgia
were more than four times as likely to receive the death penalty than if the
victim was African American.38
McCleskey presented two constitutional arguments to the Supreme
Court based on this apparent discrimination: (1) that the influence of race on
the imposition of the death penalty violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment,39 and (2) that, in accordance with Furman, the
influence of the arbitrary factor of race in the Georgia scheme violated the
Eighth Amendment.40
Justice Lewis Powell, writing for the majority, dismissed McCleskey’s
equal protection claim on the basis that he did not produce evidence of
discrimination in his conviction and sentencing.41 In other words, although
McCleskey demonstrated a statewide discriminatory effect, he did not prove
that his conviction was the product of discriminatory intent on behalf of
anyone involved in his case.42
The majority’s dismissal of McCleskey’s Eighth Amendment challenge
appeared to foreclose the possibility of empirically based challenges to the
death penalty.43 Justice Powell explained that the Georgia scheme was not
34. See id. at 286–87 (explaining that McCleskey attempted to demonstrate that race
impermissibly influenced the imposition of the death penalty in Georgia).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 283.
37. Id. at 286. The Baldus Study analyzed over 2,000 murders committed in Georgia
throughout the 1970s. See DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI,
JR., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 5 (1990).
38. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287.
39. Id. at 292–93.
40. Id. at 299.
41. Id. at 292–93.
42. Id. This is in line with the Supreme Court’s equal protection analysis requiring a showing
of intent when only disparate impact on a protected class is shown. See Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“[O]ur cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official
act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely
because it has a racially disproportionate impact.”).
43. Shatz & Dalton, supra note 10, at 1241.
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cruel and unusual for the familiar reasons that it narrowed “the class of
murders subject to the death penalty” and provided for an “automatic appeal
of a death sentence to the State Supreme Court.”44 Even in the face of the
results of the Baldus Study, it appears that Justice Powell believed these
safeguards adequately controlled the discretion of judges and juries in
imposing death sentences. This allowed Justice Powell to dismiss
McCleskey’s Eighth Amendment claim without questioning the reliability of
the statistical evidence presented. Ultimately, Justice Powell concluded that
the “risk of racial bias” in the Georgia scheme was not “constitutionally
significant.”45 In so many words, the Court concluded that racial disparities,
such as those presented by McCleskey, were inevitable in the criminal justice
system, and, to the extent those disparities were problematic, it was the
legislatures’ responsibility to fix them, not the Court’s.46
3. Excessive Delay in Execution: Lackey Challenges
In a series of cases in the last twenty years, death row inmates have
challenged the excessive delays between sentence and execution. The first of
such cases to draw attention from the Supreme Court was Lackey v. Texas, in
which Justice Stevens authored a memorandum opinion respecting the
denial of certiorari.47 Lackey claimed the fact that he had spent seventeen
years on death row awaiting execution violated the Eighth Amendment.48
Justice Stevens divided Lackey’s claims into two parts. First, that
spending an excessive amount of time on death row exposes an inmate to the
“death row phenomenon,” which can amount to psychological torture.49
This phenomenon is described in Soering v. United Kingdom, where a European
court considered whether to extradite a German national to the United
States to face possible execution for multiple murders.50 The court stated,
“[A]ccount is to be taken not only of the physical pain experienced but also,
where there is a considerable delay before execution of the punishment, of

44. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 302, 303. The Court also identified the fact that death trials were
bifurcated and that defendants had the opportunity to present mitigating evidence as safeguards,
limiting the possibility that a death sentence would be arbitrary or capricious. Id. at 302.
45. Id. at 313.
46. See id. at 314–19.
47. 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) (mem.) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari).
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25, para. 81 (1989); see also Regina
C. Donnelly, Soering v. United Kingdom: Whether the Continued Use of the Death Penalty in the United
States Contradicts International Thinking?, 16 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 339, 340–
46, 350 (1990).
50. Soering, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 4, para. 11.
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the sentenced person’s mental anguish of anticipating the violence he is to
have inflicted on him.”51 At the time of this statement, the average delay
between sentencing and execution in the State of Virginia was between six
and eight years.52 Based on this period of delay, the European court
unanimously voted not to extradite.53
Second, Justice Stevens explained that long delays between sentencing
and execution could sap the eventual execution of any penological purpose.
In his Lackey memorandum, Justice Stevens explained that the Court had
reinstated the death penalty in Gregg in part because the Justices believed the
death penalty might serve the penological purposes of retribution and
deterrence.54 While acknowledging that a claim like Lackey’s had never been
considered by the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens gave serious consideration
to the possibility that a seventeen-year delay (and counting) between issuance
of a death sentence and execution might rob the death penalty of its supposed
retributive or deterrent purposes.55 Long delays between sentencing and
execution affect the value of the death penalty as a deterrent because they
reduce the possibility that an inmate will actually be executed, rather than
die in prison.56 Furthermore, the death penalty does not adequately serve a
retributive purpose if society must wait an inordinate amount of time for an
inmate, whose murderous conduct incites moral outrage, to be executed.57
Since Lackey, other death row inmates have asserted similar claims—
delays in their post-conviction appeal processes—rendered their sentences
unconstitutional.58 In more recent cases, Justice Stephen Breyer has taken
the mantle from Justice Stevens in dissenting from denial of certiorari in cases
involving Lackey claims. In Elledge v. Florida, the petitioner spent twenty-three
years awaiting the conclusion of his post-conviction appeals process.59 Justice
Breyer reiterated Justice Stevens’s concerns from Lackey.60 Additionally,
Justice Breyer characterized the petitioner’s claim as “serious” because the

51. Id. at 33, para. 100.
52. Id. at 17, para. 56.
53. Id. at 43, para. 1.
54. Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) (mem.) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of
certiorari) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)).
55. Id. (“Though novel, petitioner’s claim is not without foundation.”).
56. See infra Part II.B.
57. See infra Part II.B.
58. See, e.g., Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Knight v. Florida,
528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
59. Elledge, 525 U.S. at 944.
60. Id.

LEVY_FINALEDITS_GUNEY (DO NOT DELETE)

Summer 2015]

JONES V. CHAPPELL

8/25/2015 1:09 PM

659

delay was the result of the State’s own faulty post-conviction process.61
In Knight v. Florida, the Court denied certiorari of Lackey claims asserted
by two petitioners who had been on death row for nearly twenty and twentyfive years, respectively.62 Again, Justice Breyer dissented from denial of
certiorari, arguing that as a rule, a delay of at least twenty years or more
between sentencing and execution raised constitutional concerns about the
validity of an inmate’s death sentence.63 In support of his argument, Justice
Breyer cited the same concerns he and Justice Stevens had articulated in
earlier cases, as well as the fact that the number of inmates who had spent
more than twenty years on death row was multiplying across the country.64
Justice Clarence Thomas disagreed and argued that giving death row
inmates yet another constitutional challenge to their death sentence would
only extend the delays between sentencing and execution.65 Furthermore,
Justice Thomas concluded that in the five years since the Court’s denial of
certiorari in Lackey, lower courts across the country had “resoundingly
rejected” the claim that delay between sentencing and execution raised
concerns about the constitutionality of an inmate’s death sentence.66
Therefore, according to Justice Thomas, the legitimacy of Lackey-type claims
was no longer a live issue.67 Justice Breyer disagreed on this point, noting that
only four lower court decisions addressed a Lackey claim on the merits, and,
in three of those four cases, the delay was less than twenty years.68

B. The California Death Penalty Scheme
The California death penalty scheme is unique in its scope, which is at
least part of the reason that California is home to the largest death row

61. Id.
62. Knight, 528 U.S. at 990 (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari); id. at 993–94
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 999 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Finally, the constitutional issue, even if limited to delays
of close to 20 years or more, has considerable practical importance.”).
64. Id. at 993, 999.
65. Id. at 992 (Thomas, J., concurring).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 992–93 (“Five years ago, Justice Stevens issued an invitation to state and lower
courts to serve as ‘laboratories’ in which the viability of this claim could receive further study. . . . I
submit that the Court should consider the experiment concluded.”).
68. Id. at 998 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Bell v. State, 938 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. Crim. App.
1996)) (twenty-year delay); Ex parte Bush, 695 So. 2d 138 (Ala. 1997) (sixteen-year delay); State v.
Smith, 931 P.2d 1272 (Mont. 1996) (thirteen-year delay); People v. Massie, 967 P.2d 29 (Cal. 1998)
(sixteen-year delay).
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population in the nation.69 The breadth of the California scheme,70 the
delays in the post-conviction appeals process,71 and the population of death
row72 have grown together for the past four decades.
California’s current death penalty scheme is a product of a 1978 state
ballot proposition known as the “Briggs Initiative,” which replaced the
narrower 1977 Death Penalty Law and greatly increased the number of
death-eligible crimes.73 The Briggs Initiative was advertised to voters as
“giv[ing] Californians the toughest death penalty law in the country.”74 The
Briggs Initiative attempted to, and arguably did, accomplish this goal by
more than doubling the number of special circumstances—which make a
first-degree murderer death-eligible—bringing the total number of deatheligible murders from twelve to twenty-eight.75
Since 1978, the breadth of the California scheme has been expanded
by voter initiatives in 1990,76 1996,77 and 2000,78 each time increasing the
number of special circumstances that may trigger death eligibility. The heart
of the California death penalty scheme is contained in section 190.2 of the
California Penal Code, which delineates the list of special circumstances.79
There are currently twenty-two such circumstances specifically enumerated
69. Death
Row
Inmates
by
State,
DEATH
PENALTY
INFO.
CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-rowyear?scid=9&did=188#state (last visited May 7, 2015).
70. See infra notes 76–82 and accompanying text.
71. See Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2014).
72. Id.
73. See Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The California Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem for Furman?,
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283, 1312 (1997).
74. California Center for Research and Education in Government, California Journal Ballot
Proposition Analysis, CAL. J., Nov. 1978, at 4–5;Arthur L. Alarcón & Paula M. Mitchell, Executing the
Will of the Voters?: A Roadmap to Mend or End the California Legislature’s Multi-Billion-Dollar Death Penalty
Debacle, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. S41, S142 (2011).
75. Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 74, at S137–38.
76. In 1990, California voters passed Propositions 114 and 115, which added five more
special circumstances and increased the number of death-eligible crimes to thirty-three. Crime
Victims Justice Reform Act, ch. 1165, sec. 16, 1989 Cal. Stat. 4486, 4486–88 (codified at CAL.
PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 1990)); Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 74, at S143, S146.
77. In 1996, California voters passed Propositions 195 and 196, which added three more
special circumstances, bringing the total number of death-eligible crimes to thirty-six. Alarcón &
Mitchell, supra note 74, at S146.
78. In 2000, California voters passed Propositions 18 and 21, which added three additional
special circumstances, increasing the number of death-eligible crimes enacted by the California
voters to thirty-nine. See CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, PRIMARY ELECTION BALLOT PAMPHLET 32, 44
(2000), available at libraryweb.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2000p.pdf; Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note
74, at S156.
79. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(1)–(22) (West 2014).
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by section 190.2, that, in turn, encompass thirty-nine categories of firstdegree murder.80
Research demonstrates that, based on the breadth of section 190.2, a
staggering percentage of murderers in California are statutorily eligible for
the death penalty. Professors Steven Shatz and Nina Rivkind demonstrated
that a comparison of the 1997 version of California’s first-degree murder
statute and section 190.2 revealed that there were only seven narrow
categories of first-degree murderers in California who were not statutorily
death-eligible.81 Additionally, David Baldus, one of the authors of the study
featured in the McCleskey case, performed his own analysis of the California
death penalty, finding that, under the 2008 version of section 190.2, 95% of
defendants convicted of first-degree murder were statutorily death-eligible.82
In 2004, California established the California Commission on the Fair
Administration of Justice (“Commission”) by California State Senate
Resolution Number 44.83 The Commission was a bipartisan coalition of legal
scholars and professionals tasked with analyzing, among other things, the
administration of the death penalty in California.84 The Commission
provided the most comprehensive review of the California death penalty in
operation and explained simply that each year since 1978 far more inmates
have been added to the death row population than have been executed.85
The Commission identified several delays in California’s capital postconviction process. The first step in the post-conviction review process is the
defendant’s automatic appeal to the California Supreme Court. The
Commission found that, on average, inmates on death row waited three to
five years to be appointed counsel for their direct appeal.86 Once counsel was
appointed and all briefs were filed, the Commission identified a delay of more
than two years in scheduling oral arguments before the California Supreme
Court.87 The next step in the post-conviction review process is the inmate’s

80. Id.
81. Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 73, at 1318.
82. Petitioner’s Evidentiary Hearing Exhibits: Amended Declaration of David C. Baldus at
14, Ashmus v. Wong, No. 3:93-CV-00594-TEH (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2010) [hereinafter The Baldus
Declaration].
83. CALIFORNIA COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT
113 (Gerald Uelman ed., 2008), available at http://ccfaj.org/documents/CCFAJFinalReport.pdf
[hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT].
84. Id. at 1–9.
85. Id. at 121.
86. Id. at 122.
87. Id. (explaining that, as of 2008, there was a backlog of eighty fully-briefed cases ready for
oral argument, but the California Supreme Court only hears twenty to twenty-five such cases each
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state habeas corpus application. The Commission discovered there was, on
average, an eight- to ten-year delay in appointing counsel for state habeas
corpus proceedings.88 Additionally, it took twenty-two months, on average,
for the California Supreme Court to decide state habeas petitions in capital
cases.89 The last step in the post-conviction process is the inmate’s federal
habeas corpus application. The Commission found, on average, there was a
longer than six-year delay for the federal courts to decide federal habeas
petitions.90 Altogether, the estimated wait between sentencing and execution
was twenty to twenty-five years.91
The scope of the California death penalty scheme, combined with the
delays discussed above, have led to an increase in the size and in the age of
the state’s death row population. Since 1978, only thirteen prisoners in
California have been executed, while, as of the summer of 2014, ninety-four
prisoners had died from other causes while awaiting execution.92 Based on
the size of California’s death row and the fact that no one has been executed
in the state since 2006, the current ratio of more than seven-to-one deaths by
other causes to executions will likely only grow in the future.93 Furthermore,
of the 511 offenders sentenced to death in California between 1978 and
1997, only eighty-one had exhausted their post-conviction appeals when
Jones was decided.94 Of those eighty-one, 60% were granted post-conviction
relief, and only seventeen remained on death row.95 At the time of the Jones
decision, nearly half of those on death row, or 352 inmates, had yet to be
assigned habeas counsel.96 As of the summer of 2014, there were 748 people
on death row in California, making it, by far, the largest of its kind in the
country.97 Of those 748 inmates, fifty-two had been on death row for more
than thirty years.98 Additionally, there were 206 inmates who had been
serving time on California’s death row for twenty to twenty-nine years, many

year).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 122–23.
90. Id. at 123 (explaining that much of the delay in federal habeas proceedings is attributable
to California courts’ failure to publish state habeas opinions and conduct evidentiary hearings).
91. Id.
92. Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1053, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2014).
93. Id. at 1062.
94. Id. at 1055.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1058.
97. Id. at 1053. See also Death Row Inmates by State, supra note 69.
98. See Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1069–87 app. A.
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of whom were still waiting to complete their state habeas corpus review.99
Even if California began executing one death row inmate per week, a truly
unprecedented pace,100 it would still take more than fourteen years to execute
every inmate currently on death row.101
Based on the above data, the Commission resoundingly concluded that
the California death penalty is broken. On the report’s very first page, the
Commission concluded, “California’s death penalty is dysfunctional.”102
Despite the Commission’s findings and conclusions, in the six years that
passed between the Commission report and the Jones decision, the California
Legislature did nothing to address the state’s death penalty problems.

II. The Jones v. Chappell Case
Unlike so many death penalty cases before it, the Jones decision is
remarkable because it recognized the constitutional problems created by the
California death penalty scheme as it is applied. This stands in contrast to
the countless prior cases where courts have instead chosen to analyze the
death penalty law on its face alone.

A. Factual and Procedural Background
Ernest Dewayne Jones was sentenced to death on April 7, 1995 for a
murder committed in August 1992.103 After his sentence was imposed, Jones
had to wait four years for counsel to be appointed to represent him for his
direct appeal.104 Four years after appointment of counsel and after spending
eight years on death row, the California Supreme Court affirmed Jones’s
death sentence.105 In the meantime, Jones was appointed counsel for his state
habeas petition in the fall of 2000, during the pendency of his direct

99. Id.
100. In Texas, the state responsible for the most executions by far in the United States, even
in 2000, its most prolific year since 1982, only executed forty death row inmates. Executions, TEX.
DEP’T
OF
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE,
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/death_row
/dr_executions_by_year.html (last updated Apr. 16, 2015).
101. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1062.
102. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 83, at 111.
103. First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus By a Prisoner in State Custody at 415,
Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (No. 105) [hereinafter Jones’s Habeas
Petition].
104. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1060.
105. People v. Jones, 64 P.3d 762 (Cal. 2003).
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appeal.106 Jones’s state habeas petition was filed in October 2002.107 It took
the California Supreme Court until March 2009, six and a half years later,
to deny Jones’s petition in an unpublished opinion.108 Finally, in March 2010,
Jones timely filed his federal habeas petition, for which briefing was
concluded in January 2014.109
Nineteen years after being sentenced to death, Ernest Jones submitted
his First Amended Petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) in
federal district court.110 The Petition was 454 pages long and included thirty
claims for relief based on several alleged constitutional violations stemming
from Jones’s conviction and death sentence.111 Jones’s twenty-seventh claim
was a Lackey claim. He argued that, because he had been confined for nearly
two decades—while living with the uncertainty of if and when his death
sentence would ever be finalized—his sentence was unconstitutionally cruel
and unusual.112
Jones’s Amended Petition was prompted by an order of Judge Carney
for supplemental briefing and oral arguments regarding the Lackey claim from
Jones’s original petition.113 Judge Carney’s inquiry, however, was not strictly
limited to an evaluation of the validity and viability of Jones’s Lackey claim as
stated.114 Rather, Judge Carney encouraged the parties to
submit, and to address in their briefing, the relevant statistics reported in
the two law review articles referenced above, as well as any other reliable
studies or public records addressing the delay associated with the
administration of California’s death penalty, the number of individuals
on death row and the likelihood that any of those individuals will ever be
executed or will instead die of natural causes or suicide. 115

The two law review articles referred to by Judge Carney were both
written by Judge Arthur L. Alarcón of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit and concerned the tremendous economic costs of the death
penalty in California.116 Both articles only briefly mentioned the fact that

106. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1060.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Jones’s Habeas Petition, supra note 103.
111. Id. at 414–27.
112. Id. at 414, 424.
113. Order Re: Briefing and Settlement Discussions at 4–5, Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d
1050 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (No. 103).
114. See id.
115. Id. at 5.
116. See Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 74, at S41; See generally Arthur L. Alarcón, Remedies for
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many more death row inmates have died from causes other than
execution.117 In neither article was this fact addressed in the context of
arbitrariness, as defined by Furman.118 Judge Carney’s order, however, gave
a Furman twist to the Lackey claim, seeming to suggest that the long delays
between sentencing and execution rendered any eventual execution
arbitrary. In other words, those inmates were executed because they just so
happened to survive long enough to be executed by the State. As discussed
below, this was the basis for his final decision.

B. The Opinion
Judge Carney’s analysis of the issues associated with the delays in
California’s post-conviction process was based on two premises: (1) “[N]o
rational person can question that the execution of an individual carries with
it the solemn obligation of the government to ensure that the punishment is
not arbitrarily imposed and that it furthers the interests of society;”119 and (2)
Judge Carney recognized that the death penalty is unlike any other
punishment, and therefore it necessitates a corresponding heightened “‘need
for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment
in a specific case.’”120
In order to reach the merits of the Jones’s arbitrariness claim, Judge
Carney first had to address the issue of possible procedural bars. Under the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), federal courts
generally may not consider claims for habeas relief unless the inmate
asserting the claim has exhausted the remedies available to him in state
court.121 The State argued that Jones’s claims concerning delay were never
addressed in state court and therefore were not exhausted.122 AEDPA,
however, provides an exception to this procedural bar.123 Exhaustion is not
required in cases where “‘circumstances exist that render [the state] process
ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.’”124
Judge Carney explained that this exception applied in Jones because the
delays associated with California’s post-conviction appeals process could not
California’s Death Row Deadlock, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 697 (2007).
117. Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 74, at S53; Alarcón, supra note 116, at 724.
118. Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 74, at S53; Alarcón, supra note 116, at 724.
119. Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 2014).
120. Id. (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976)).
121. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (2012).
122. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1067.
123. Id. at 1067.
124. Id. at 1068 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2012)).
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be solely attributed to the death row inmates themselves.125 Instead, the State
bore responsibility for its inability to promptly appoint counsel for direct
appeal,126 schedule oral arguments before the California Supreme Court,127
and appoint state habeas counsel.128 According to Judge Carney, the State
also underfunded state habeas investigations, which in turn slowed down the
federal habeas review process.129 Judge Carney concluded that none of these
delays, which together amount to more than twenty-five years, on average,
were the result of self-serving “tactics” employed by death row inmates.130 In
Judge Carney’s estimation, it would be futile to subject Jones’s claims to
further review in California courts because the State’s procedures were the
primary source of Jones’s delays in the first place.131 Furthermore, because
there was no underlying state decision on the merits of Jones’s claims
concerning the delays he experienced, his claims were not considered under
AEDPA’s deferential standard.132 Therefore, the claim was not procedurally
barred.
In determining the death penalty regime in California was
unconstitutionally arbitrary, Judge Carney relied heavily on Furman. He
explained that Furman held that the death penalty “‘could not be imposed
under sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that it would be
inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.’”133 Judge Carney described
the Furman Court as being preoccupied with the notion that the death penalty
was being imposed in “an at best random manner against some individuals,
with ‘no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it [was]
imposed from the many cases in which it [was] not.’”134 Judge Carney further
explained that in the forty years since Furman, the Supreme Court has
maintained that “the Constitution quite simply ‘cannot tolerate the infliction
of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to
be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.’”135

125. Id. at 1066.
126. Id. (explaining that, on average, it takes three to five years for counsel to be appointed for
direct appeal).
127. Id. (explaining that it usually takes two to three years to schedule oral arguments before
the Supreme Court).
128. Id. (explaining that it takes at least eight to ten years to appoint state habeas counsel).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1068.
132. Id. at 1068 n.23.
133. Id. at 1061 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976)).
134. Id. (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring)).
135. Id. (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
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Applying the facts of delay associated with Jones’s case and, the systemic
delays in California’s capital appeals process, Judge Carney concluded that
the criterion for executing inmates “will depend upon a factor largely outside
an inmate’s control, and wholly divorced from the penological purposes the
State sought to achieve by sentencing him to death in the first instance: how
quickly the inmate proceeds through the State’s dysfunctional postconviction review process.”136
Judge Carney was concerned that, unlike many death row inmates,
Jones faced a meaningful threat of execution.137 Judge Carney addressed his
concern by presenting data about Jones’s place in the post-conviction process
relative to those inmates sentenced to death in the same year.138 Of the thirtyeight inmates sentenced to death in 1995, Jones and only six others had
completed their state habeas proceedings.139 Moreover, Jones appeared to be
even further along in the post-conviction appeals process as compared to
some inmates who had been on death row much longer. Of the 511 inmates
sentenced to death between 1978 and 1997 whose convictions were not
overturned by the California Supreme Court, 380 remained on death row at
the time of the Jones decision.140 Two hundred eighty-five of those inmates
had been on death row longer than Jones, and, of those inmates, more than
a third were still litigating their state habeas petitions.141 In the eyes of Judge
Carney, those individuals still litigating their state habeas petitions after
decades on death row did not face the “realistic possibility” of execution.142
Judge Carney concluded, “[B]ecause of the inordinate delays inherent in
California’s system, many of the rest [of the inmates in earlier stages of the
appeals process] will never be executed. They will instead live out their lives
on Death Row.”143
Ultimately, Judge Carney concluded that the systemic delays in the
post-conviction process resulted in the arbitrary execution of death row

136. Id. at 1062.
137. Id. at 1063 (“Were his petition denied today, Mr. Jones would . . . have his federal habeas
petition under review by the Ninth Circuit, effectively the last available stage before execution.”).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1069 app. A. Three hundred eighty of the original 511 inmates remained after
thirteen were executed, thirty-nine were granted relief in federal habeas proceedings, and seventynine died on death row from causes other than execution. Id.
141. Id. at 1063.
142. Id.
143. Id. (quoting Gerald F. Uelman, Death Penalty Appeals and Habeas Proceedings: The California
Experience, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 495, 496 (2009) (“‘For all practical purposes, a sentence of death in
California is a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.’”).
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inmates, thereby sapping the death penalty of either of its supposed
penological purposes: retribution or deterrence.144 To begin, Judge Carney
expressed doubt as to whether the death penalty serves as a deterrent under
any circumstances.145 With undertones of a Lackey argument, Judge Carney
explained that, for the death penalty to have any deterrent effect, it must be
administered in a timely manner.146 If not, as with the case in California,
“[t]he reasonable expectation of an individual contemplating a capital crime
in California then is that if he is caught, it does not matter whether he is
sentenced to death—he realistically faces only life imprisonment.”147 Finally,
Judge Carney dismissed the possibility that the California death penalty
served as a deterrent by evoking Justice Stewart’s now-famous comparison
of the death sentence to being struck by lightning:148 “Under such a system,
the death penalty is about as effective a deterrent to capital crime as the
possibility of a lightning strike is to going outside in the rain.”149
Judge Carney also believed that the death penalty as applied in
California did not serve retributive purpose. He reached this conclusion
based on the fact that every inmate on death row committed an act the State
deemed terrible enough to warrant punishment by death, yet inmates wait
on average twenty-five years to complete the appeals process.150 As a result,
many die before being executed, rendering the possibility of retribution in
those cases moot.151 Judge Carney was concerned that the delays were
unnecessary and were created by the State of California, explaining, “Were
such lengthy delay an isolated, or even necessary, circumstance of a system
that otherwise acts purposefully to give meaning to society’s moral outrage,
the retributive purpose of the death penalty might continue to be served.”152
Judge Carney concluded the death penalty cannot serve society’s moral
outrage if it is exercised against a random sampling of those whose crimes
144. Id. at 1063.
145. Id. at 1063–64 (“Whether the death penalty has any deterrent effect when administered
in a functional system is a widely contested issue upon which no clear empirical consensus has been
reached.”).
146. Id. at 1064 (citing COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 83, at 115 n.8 (“If there is a deterrent
value [to the death penalty], however, it is certainly dissipated by long intervals between judgment
of death and its execution.”)).
147. Id.
148. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“These death
sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and
unusual.”).
149. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1064.
150. Id. at 1065.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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society has deemed worthy of death.153

III. The Consequences of Jones
In holding the California death penalty unconstitutional, the Jones
decision, if it stands, will result in Jones’s and others’ death sentences being
commuted in California. Additionally, the decision may have a significant
impact on the viability of future empirical challenges to the death penalty.

A. The Impact of Jones on California’s Death Row
Judge Carney held that the California death penalty is unconstitutional,
at least as applied to Jones and his similarly situated cohort. That cohort
includes all death row inmates sentenced to death in California on April 7,
1995—the day Jones received his death sentence—or before. If the Jones
decision survives appeal in the Ninth Circuit, and then perhaps the U.S.
Supreme Court, the death sentences of Jones and the 285 inmates sentenced
before him presumably would be vacated and replaced with the sentence of
life without the possibility of parole.154 Jones does not, however, directly
impact the death sentences of California inmates sentenced after 1995
because Jones challenged the California death penalty scheme in application
rather than on its face. Theoretically, at least, Jones’s challenge can only
account for his experience and the experience of those who were sentenced
to death before him.
Undoubtedly, inmates sentenced to death in California after 1995 have
experienced, and will likely continue to experience, long delays between
sentencing and execution.155 It will be up to the inmates to test the limits of
Judge Carney’s decision and whether it can be applied to a petitioner who
has spent less than nineteen years on death row. Jones cannot be read as
creating a bright-line rule concerning delay because Judge Carney hints that
an isolated incident of delay would be constitutionally permissible.156 Only
when the delays are systemic, as they were determined to be in Jones, do they
violate the Eighth Amendment.
There is also the faint possibility that the delays plaguing the
administration of the death penalty in California could be remedied, in

153. Id.
154. Id. at 1063.
155. See supra Part I.B.
156. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1065 (“Were such lengthy delay an isolated, or even necessary,
circumstance . . . the [constitutionally] retributive purpose of the death penalty might continue to
be served.”).
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which case a so-called “Jones claim” would no longer be viable. Judge Carney
suggested that the constitutional problem posed by the inordinate delays in
California post-conviction process is curable. In particular, Judge Carney
focused on the 2008 Commission Report that outlined several changes to
California’s post-conviction process, which could increase its efficiency
dramatically.157 Judge Carney seemed particularly concerned with bringing
California’s delay between sentencing and execution in line with the national
average, which was twelve and a half years between 2000 and 2012.158 The
Commission estimated that, if the State implemented its recommended
changes, the average delay would decrease to between eleven and fourteen
years.159 Although far from drawing a bright line when the California death
penalty would be constitutional again, the Jones decision makes clear that the
status quo is unacceptable. The State of California must take action to
streamline its post-conviction appeals process if it would like to maintain the
death penalty in the state.

B. Future Empirical Challenges to the Death Penalty in
California
Using empirical evidence in evaluating the constitutionality of death
penalty law means requiring courts not to accept on faith that a scheme
works the way it is supposed to. Judge Carney’s decision, for the first time,
validates looking beyond the words of death penalty statutes. As discussed
above, Judge Carney focused his criticism on the narrow issue of the delays
in the post-conviction process and the resulting arbitrariness of inmates dying
from causes other than execution. The Jones decision, however, ignores the
other arbitrary ways in which the death penalty is meted out in California.
Nonetheless, Jones is remarkable because it is the first time that any court has
meaningfully evaluated empirical evidence in order to assess the realities of
the California death penalty. In this regard, the approach used in Jones of
determining the unconstitutionality of the California death penalty scheme
in application may provide a road map for other courts determining the
soundness of death penalty schemes in light of evidence that the scheme
operates arbitrarily, regardless of the source of that arbitrariness.
The opinion in Jones is filled with powerful statistical evidence regarding
the shortcomings of the California death penalty.160 These statistics, which
157. Id. at 1067.
158. Id. The average delay between sentencing and execution nationwide rose to 15.8 years in
the year 2012. Id.
159. Id.; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 83, at 124.
160. See supra Part I.B.
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both quantified the delays in the post-conviction process generally, and
situated Jones relative to his peers, demonstrate the random nature by which
death row inmates die in California. In this regard, Jones is an empirically
based decision because Judge Carney relied on real world statistical evidence
in holding the California scheme unconstitutional.
In general, there are two types of empirically based studies of the death
penalty that can and have been used to attack the constitutionality of death
sentences. First, there are “no-narrowing” challenges, which are directed at
the statutory schemes that do not provide a meaningful basis for
distinguishing between those murderers who receive the death penalty and
those who do not.161 Second are studies that demonstrate actual arbitrariness
in the death penalty based on the influence of impermissible factors such as
race, gender, and geography.162
The challenge articulated in Jones does not seem to fit neatly into either
of these categories. One could argue that the challenge is its own unique
blend, drawing on both Furman and Lackey, and therefore does not have
anything to contribute to future challenges that do not involve arbitrariness
resulting from the long delays between sentencing and execution. The
influence of Jones’s Lackey claim is apparent throughout the opinion. It is
especially prominent in the discussions as to whether the death penalty in
California serves any penological purpose. To that end, Judge Carney
explained, “As for the random few for whom execution does become a
reality, they will have languished for so long on Death Row that their
execution will serve no retributive or deterrent purpose and will be
arbitrary.”163
The Jones decision, however, is based on concrete, indisputable
empirical evidence, as opposed to some abstract analysis of how the
California death penalty is theoretically supposed to work. As discussed
above, Judge Carney clearly articulated that arbitrariness is arbitrariness and
impermissible no matter where it occurs in the process of handing down a
death sentence. In other words, the Eighth Amendment does not permit the
influence of arbitrariness regardless of where it originates, be it the delay
between sentence and execution, racial bias, or any other source. In this
regard, the Jones decision may have profound implications for future
empirically based challenges to the California death penalty scheme.

161. See generally Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 73; The Baldus Declaration, supra note 82.
162. See Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, The Impact of Legally Inappropriate Factors on Death
Sentencing for California Homicides, 1990–1999, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 44–45 (2005); Shatz &
Dalton, supra note 10, at 1229.
163. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1053.
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Fortunately for opponents of the death penalty, legal scholarship is filled
with studies demonstrating the ways in which the California death penalty is
arbitrary. The data from some of these studies has already served as the basis
for legal challenges, still others have yet to be used, but in either case, the
viability of legal challenges based on data may increase in the aftermath of
Jones.
1. No-Narrowing Challenges
No-narrowing challenges are rooted in the idea that Furman was
concerned that, of the many death-eligible crimes committed in Georgia,
very few actually resulted in a death sentence.164 As discussed above, the
Court relied on the statistic that only 15 to 20% of all death-eligible
murderers were ultimately sentenced to death in Georgia at the time of
Furman.165 Without establishing a bright-line rule, the Court in Furman
established implicitly that this rate was below the permissible constitutional
threshold.
Research demonstrates that California’s ratio of death-eligible crimes
committed to the number of resulting death sentences is considerably lower
than the ratio discussed in Furman. The problem lies with section 190.2 of the
California Penal Code, which outlines the special circumstances that may be
applied to elevate a first-degree murder to a death-eligible offense.166
Professors Shatz and Rivkind demonstrated that under the 1997 version of
the statute, seven out of eight, or well over 80%, first-degree murderers in
California were statutorily eligible for the death penalty.167 Conversely, only
one out of those eight defendants was eventually sentenced to death.168 Thus,
California’s death penalty rate, from 1988 to 1992, as calculated by Shatz
and Rivkind’s study, was 11.4%, well below the rate found to be
unconstitutional in Furman.169
David Baldus performed his own analysis of the California death
penalty.170 The purpose of his study was, in part, to examine the scope of
death eligibility under California law.171 His study analyzed a sample taken

164. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 386 n.11 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Shatz &
Dalton, supra note 10, at 1231.
165. Furman, 408 U.S. at 386 n.11; Shatz & Dalton, supra note 10, at 1231.
166. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 2014).
167. Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 73, at 1332.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. The Baldus Declaration, supra note 82, at 2.
171. Id.
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from 27,453 homicide cases occurring in California between January 1, 1978
and June 30, 2002.172 Professor Baldus’s California study demonstrated that
only 4.6% of all death-eligible offenders were sentenced to death in the state,
which is considerably lower that the 15 to 20% at issue in Furman.173
Despite the evidence that section 190.2 does not meaningfully narrow
the class of death-eligible offenders, the California Supreme Court has, time
and time again, approved the California scheme on its face, without looking
at whether section 190.2 actually has the required narrowing effect.174 In BenSholom v. Ayers,175 however, one court at least addressed, in dicta, the breadth
of death eligibility in California. Judge Anthony Ishii of the District Court for
the Eastern District of California recognized “the class of [death-eligible]
murderers to be very broad under the California scheme.”176 Judge Ishii
concluded that “the merits of the [no-narrowing] claim could be considered
debatable among reasonable jurists.”177
Jones could have a powerful effect on the impact of no-narrowing
challenges going forward. If, as in Jones, the California Supreme Court, or
any other court for that matter, examined the statistical evidence of the
breadth of section 190.2, they would likely have to find that the statute is
impermissibly broad. It is difficult to fathom that a court could look at the
evidence, such as the research by Professors Shatz and Rivkind, or that of
David Baldus, and come to any other conclusion. The impact of Jones is that
it may provide future courts with a model for how to assess the
constitutionality of the California death penalty by using statistical analysis
in ascertaining how the scheme actually operates.
2. Evidence of Actual Arbitrariness
As discussed above, the McCleskey decision signaled to many the
foreclosure of any future challenges to the death penalty based on empirical
evidence.178 Despite those signals, several legal scholars and social scientists
have conducted studies of the impact of arbitrary factors on the application

172. Id.
173. Id. at 29.
174. See, e.g., People v. Ray, 914 P.2d 846, 872 (Cal. 1996), cert denied, 519 U.S. 967 (1996);
People v. Arias, 913 P.2d. 980, 1040–41 (Cal. 1996), cert denied, 520 U.S. 1251 (1997).
175. No. 1:93-CV-05531 AWI, 2008 WL 4167079, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2008).
176. Id.
177. Id. at *3. The Ninth Circuit did not address this issue on appeal, claiming that it was not
ripe because Ben-Sholom’s death sentence had been vacated. Ben-Sholom v. Ayers, 674 F.3d 1095,
1097 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012).
178. Shatz & Dalton, supra note 10, at 1241.
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of the death penalty in California. These studies demonstrate that the death
penalty has been significantly influenced by improper factors such as race,
geography, and gender.
Professors Glenn L. Pierce and Michael L. Radelet analyzed racial and
geographic disparities in the imposition of the death penalty by conducting
a study of all homicides committed in California between 1990 and 1999.179
Just as in McCleskey, this study showed that the race of a murder victim
dramatically affected the likelihood that the death penalty would be
imposed.180 Pierce and Radelet found that murders involving white victims
were 3.7 times more likely to result in a death sentence than those involving
African American victims.181 Similarly, murderers whose victims were white
were 4.7 times more likely to be sentenced to death than those who killed
Hispanic victims.182 These disparities are in line with results of similar studies
in other states.183
Pierce and Radelet further determined that the location where a crime
was committed had a significant effect on the likelihood that the death
penalty would be imposed.184 Their study revealed large variations in the
death sentencing rates of different counties,185 leading them to conclude
“death sentencing in California is highest in counties with a low population
density and a high proportion of non-Hispanic white residents.”186
A recent study by Professor Steven Shatz and Naomi Shatz found
disparities in the application of the death penalty on the basis of the victim’s
gender as well as the gender of the defendant involved in the crime.187 After
analyzing roughly 1,300 first-degree murder convictions over a three-year
period, they found that defendants involved in a single-victim murder, where
that victim was female, were more than seven times as likely to receive the
death penalty than if the victim was male.188 Furthermore, women represent
5.3% of convicted, death-eligible, first-degree murderers not sentenced to

179. Pierce & Radelet, supra note 162, at 12–13.
180. Id. at 19.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Shatz & Dalton, supra note 10, at 1248–51.
184. Pierce & Radelet, supra note 162, at 31.
185. Id. at 38 (“Excluding counties with smaller populations, death sentencing rates vary from
roughly .005% of all homicides to rates five times higher.”).
186. Id. at 31.
187. Steven F. Shatz & Naomie R. Shatz, Chivalry is Not Dead: Murder, Gender, and the Death
Penalty, 27 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 64, 105–10 (2012).
188. Id. at 92–93, 107.
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death, yet they make up only 1.2% of those sentenced to death.189
Moreover, another study by Professor Shatz and Professor Terry
Dalton demonstrated that even the crime’s location within an individual
county dramatically affects the likelihood that the death penalty will be
imposed. The study examined 473 first-degree murder convictions in
Alameda County, California occurring between 1978 and 2001.190 The study
found that those murders committed in the southern half of the county,
which is vastly more suburban and populated by white residents, were over
2.5 times more likely to result in a death sentence than those committed in
the more urban North County, where the majority of residents are people of
color.191 Furthermore, the murders in South County were no more
aggravated than the ones committed in North County, and thus this could
not provide an alternative explanation for the disparate results.192
3. Jones’s Potential Impact on the Utility of Empirical Studies
Putting aside the equal protection arguments prompted by these
statistics, which are beyond the scope of this Note, the decision in Jones could
impact the applicability of these types of studies in making legal challenges
to the death penalty based on a violation of the Eighth Amendment.193 These
studies indicate the administration of the death penalty in California is
influenced by the legally impermissible factors of race, geography, and
gender. In McCleskey, the U.S. Supreme Court was presented with very
similar evidence and essentially ignored these factors because the Court had
settled into the practice of approving death penalty statutes simply on their
face. To the five Justices in the majority, the statistics presented in McCleskey
were an afterthought, because, in their eyes, the Georgia scheme was
theoretically sound. Jones potentially moves past that presumption. In Jones,
Judge Carney looked to the data that demonstrated what the practical effects
of the California scheme were and continue to be, and determined that the
situation was constitutionally unacceptable.

Conclusion
There is no meaningful distinction between the empirical evidence
relied on in Jones and the statistics presented in the other types of challenges

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 106.
Shatz & Dalton, supra note 10, at 1260.
Id. at 1267.
Id. at 1268.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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to the California death penalty. Empirical evidence continues to mount,
demonstrating that the death penalty in California is overly broad,
discriminatorily imposed, and arbitrarily carried out in ways discussed above.
Evidence of California’s death penalty scheme’s practical effects, or any other
state’s for that matter, are important and should no longer be ignored. The
statistics show how arbitrarily the death penalty actually works in practice
and demonstrate that it must either be modified or eradicated. The Jones
decision may finally provide an opening for other courts to holistically assess
the death penalty in California, its practical applications, and find it
unconstitutional as well.

